We study price efficiency and trading behavior in laboratory limit order markets with asymmetrically informed traders. Markets differ in the number of insiders present and in the subset of traders who receive information about the number of insiders present. We observe that price efficiency (i) is the higher the higher the number of insiders in the mar- JEL classification: C92, D82, G12, G14
Introduction
Limit order markets (LOM) are the major trading protocol on financial markets nowadays.
1 Despite the common application of this trading mechanism, little is known about the process of information aggregation into prices. Two major problems complicate the use of theoretical and empirical methods. Theoretical studies have to deal with extremely large action spaces that originate from the possibility to trade in continuous time and the freedom to choose between limit orders (LO) and market orders (MO).
2 Empirical studies suffer from the availability of data that reliably identifies persons trading in the asset while in possession of new and relevant information. This problem is mainly driven by legal prosecution of traders holding that relevant information, commonly referred to as (corporate) insiders.
In this study we analyze laboratory LOMs that differ in the realizations of two treatment variables. We manipulate (i) the number of insiders in a market and (ii) we vary the subset of traders who receives information on the number of insiders present. With these treatment variations we elaborate on three research questions (RQ).
RQ 1) How does competition among insiders affect price efficiency in limit order markets?
So far, no study systematically investigates this RQ. Consequently, predictions on competition effects can only be deduced from studies loosely related to LOMs. While these studies suggest a positive impact of competition on price efficiency, little can be said about the development of price efficiency over time. Kyle (1985) , Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) , and Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) provide some insights but must be interpreted cautiously as these models implement pricing mechanisms other than LOMs. The same constraints apply to experimental studies as no study specifically focuses on competition issues 1 See Parlour and Seppi (2008) and Gould et al. (2013) for surveys on limit order markets. Examples for limit order markets are: Euronext (Brussels, Amsterdam, Paris), Stockholm Stock Exchange, Toronto Stock Exchange, and Archipelago Exchange. Examples for trading systems: INET, ArcaEx, Reuters D2000-2. NYSE, Nasdaq, London stock exchange are hybrid markets where designated market makers have to compete with other traders submitting quotes to the limit order book.
2 Limit orders are offers to buy/sell at a predetermined price and are collected in the limit order book. Market orders accept outstanding offers. The two order types have distinct features and traders face the following trade-off: LOs feature better conditions in terms of prices, however execution is uncertain as it requires the order's acceptance by another trader. On the other hand, MOs offer immediate execution but at less favorable prices. Note that other commonly used market institutions only allow for one trading channel. Call markets allow traders to submit LOs, while market maker institutions allow for MOs only.
RQ 2 elaborates on a specific aspect of real world markets that cannot be addressed in theoretical models. These models assume that traders are informed about the underlying structure of the economy. Concealing information on the presence of insiders undermines this assumption causing models to break down.
However, real markets are characterized by high uncertainty about the presence of insiders (potentially) limiting the predictive power of theoretical results. By varying the subset of traders who receives information about the number of insiders present we study potential consequences of dropping the assumption of common knowledge about the underlying structure of the economy in LOMs.
RQ 2) How does the subset of traders who receives information about the number of insiders present affect price efficiency in limit order markets?
So far, the literature did not agree on likely consequences. In his market maker experiments, Schnitzlein (2002) is the first who deliberately challenges the common knowledge assumption and finds that price efficiency is significantly lower when the number of insiders must be inferred. However, Camerer and Weigelt (1991) , Meulbroek (1992) , and Bruguier et al. (2010) challenge the result and argue that human traders are able to infer the presence of insiders from the trading process. Still, we know little about the robustness of these results and how manipulations in the degree of competition affect them.
In RQ 3 we elaborate on a specific feature of LOMs: the freedom of choice between limit and market orders to make transactions. The insiders' choice is of particular interest as it determines the way in which information is reflected in prices.
RQ 3) Which order types do insiders choose to make transactions?
While there is ample evidence that insiders show abnormally high trading activity (Easley and O'Hara, 1987; Meulbroek, 1992 To evaluate RQ 1 to 3 we conduct laboratory LOMs. Each market is populated by either 0, 1, 2 or 4 insiders, who learn the asset's value, and 6 uninformed traders, who do not receive that piece of information. Furthermore, we define three information sets that determine whether none of the traders, only insiders, or all traders learn the number of insiders present in the market. We observe that price efficiency (i) is the higher the higher the number of insiders in the market but (ii) is unaffected by changes in the subset of traders who know about the number of insiders present. (iii) Independent of the number of insiders, price efficiency increases gradually over time. (iv) The insiders' information is reflected in prices via limit (market) orders if the asset's value is inside (outside) the bid-ask spread. (v) In situations where limit and market orders yield positive profits, insiders clearly prefer market orders, indicating a strong desire for immediate transactions.
The experiment
In each experimental session, ten subjects form a cohort and interact in a sequence of sixteen independent periods. Subjects receive an endowment of 20 Euros as compensation for their participation in the experiment. Earnings (losses) generated during the experiment are added (subtracted) to (from) this amount. At the beginning of each period a subject is assigned to either participate in the market experiment or to perform a calculation task. 3 The subjects' assignment to one of the two tasks may change from period to period and does not follow any particular rule.
The market experiment -being a trader
Subjects assigned to participate in the market experiment in a given period, called traders, are endowed with 60 assets and 4800 Taler, the experimental currency. Assets have a lifespan of one period and are bought back by the experimenter at the end of the market (period) at their buy-back value (BBV).
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Before trading starts a random draw from a uniform distribution U (20, 80) determines the BBV (with one decimal place). The trading mechanism is a continuous double auction with open order books. While the mechanism used in the experiment replicates all major features of existing LOMs, we nevertheless tried to keep the environment simple and easily understandable.
5 Figure 1 shows a screenshot of the trading screen used in the experiment. In the following explanation, references to numbered boxes indicate the area of the screen associated with the corresponding action or information. Traders are free to choose any trading strategy, i.e. they are free to submit buy and sell offers (referred to as limit orders, Box 1) or accept outstanding 3 The calculation task was created to keep all subjects busy in each period. 4 Taler and asset holdings are reset at the beginning of each period. 5 We conducted two trial periods to allow subjects to become familiar with the trading procedure. 4 offers placed by other traders (referred to as market orders, Box 2). There are no restrictions to the size of limit orders and the partial execution of limit orders is possible. Order books are empty at the beginning of trading and limit orders are executed according to price and then time priority. Posted limit orders can be canceled at any time without costs (Box 3). Shorting stocks and borrowing money is not allowed.
6 No interest is paid on Taler holdings and there are no transaction costs. The trading protocol and the experimental implementation guarantee traders' anonymity. Each period lasts 240 seconds.
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The left hand side of the trading screen (Box 4) provides traders with current information on their asset and Taler holdings and their current wealth (assets evaluated at the most recent transaction price). In a separate box the trader's information (BBV if an insider and/or information on the presence of insiders)
is displayed. All transaction prices with the corresponding trading time are shown in a real time chart.
Treatments
Markets differ in two treatment variables. First, to study competition effects, we vary the number of insiders. Each market is populated by either 0, 1, 2 or 4 insiders (traders who learn the BBV of the asset before trading starts) and six uninformed traders who do not learn the BBV. Thus six to ten traders constitute a market. Second, we vary the subset of traders who receives information about the number of insiders present. This is done to study situations where the traders' information about the structure of the economy is incomplete. Three information sets exist. Either none of the traders (information set A), only insiders (information set B), or all traders (information set C) learn the number of insiders present in the market. The experiment has a 4x3 design and combining both variables in all reasonable ways, yields eleven treatments. Columns 2-4
in Table 1 provide details on the composition of the trader population and the information sets across treatments. We use the following notation to discrimi- Two design choices necessitate a more detailed discussion. Obviously, each manipulation of the number of insiders leads to simultaneous changes in two parameters: the number of insiders (our variable of interest) changes, but as we keep the number of uniformed traders constant the total number of traders, i.e. the market size, changes too. Strictly speaking, we violate the ceteris paribus condition and a joint hypothesis problem emerges. The issue might be solved by adding additional sessions featuring markets with a constant number of insiders and variations in the number of uninformed traders.
However, we do not expect these variations to impact our results as the number of uninformed traders is already large and variations imply only minor changes. . Note that the parametrization ensures that there is enough cash in the market to allow all outstanding shares to be transacted at their BBV. With C/A-ratios between 1 and 4, the variation across markets is comparatively small and thus of minor importance. We do not expect a significant impact on our results. 
Traders' earnings

Implementation of the experiment
Within a session (16 periods) each treatment specification was implemented at least once. The remaining five periods were used for replications of treatments. The sequence of treatments within a session did not follow any particular rule.
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We conducted 12 sessions yielding 15 observations from treatments with no insiders (T ). In total we have 192 observations. Sessions were conducted in June 2011 at the University of Innsbruck with a total of 120 students (bachelor and master students from different fields). Most subjects already took part in other experiments in economics but each subject participated in only one session of this study. The software was programmed with z-Tree 3.3.6. by Fischbacher (2007) and subjects were recruited using ORSEE by Greiner (2004) .
At the beginning of each session subjects had 15 minutes to study the written instructions on their own. This was done to eliminate any possible experimenter bias. Afterwards, the trading mechanism and screen were explained in detail, followed by two trial markets to allow subjects to become familiar with the trading procedure. All subjects received identical instructions and the same 10 An inactive trader's final wealth equals the average wealth in the market. Thus, earnings for inactive traders are by definition 0. This is public knowledge (see the Instructions in Appendix B for details).
11 The average number of solved calculations was 28 and the maximum number was 60. 12 We generated four treatment sequences and each of these sequences was used in three sessions. See Appendix A for a summary of sequences A to D. 7 amount of training.
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At the beginning of a period subjects were informed about whether they participate in the market experiment or in the calculation task. If a trader was an insider in that period, he learned the BBV before trading started. At the same time, traders received information as defined by information sets A, B, and C.
Within a session, each subject participated in the market experiment in 12 or 13 periods (being an insider in three or four periods and an uninformed trader in nine or ten periods) and in the calculation task in three or four periods. Each 
Results
Price efficiency
To quantify the degree of convergence between prices and the asset's buy-back value (BBV) we calculate AD, which is the absolute deviation between the (volume weighted) mean price (P ) and the BBV in a market. Lower values of AD indicate smaller deviations and thus a higher level of price efficiency.
The specific parameters of the experiment allow to calculate a benchmark level of AD, given that the asset is traded at random prices within the range of possible BBV realizations (U (20, 80)). The threshold level for AD depends on the number of transactions. In the limit, as the number of transactions converges to infinity, AD is uniformly distributed around a value of 15. 14 We refer to this benchmark as the "random trading benchmark" (RTB) and use it to distinguish price efficiency levels driven by random trading activity from levels where prices reliably reflect insider information. 13 In the trial periods all subjects took part in the market experiment once being an insider and once being an uninformed trader. This was done in order to familiarize subjects with the payment structure.
14 For a single, randomly priced transaction AD is a random number drawn from a triangular distribution with mean=20.
It is no surprise that the highest value of AD is realized in markets without insider participation and no information on their absence. With increasing insider participation the level of mispricing decreases. However, values of AD in markets with a monopoly insider still lack statistically significant difference from the RTB. Only with competing insiders in treatments T To elaborate on RQ 1 and RQ 2, we estimate the following fixed effects regression using AD as dependent variable. Session, indexed s, is the panel variable taking values from 1 to 12 and market, indexed m, define the time dimension taking values from 1 to 16. The total number of observations is 192.
The following variables constitute the set of regressors: for each market to test whether their conjecture also holds in our experimental setting. For the computation of GARCH intensity we first calculate the absolute transaction price changes over intervals of 2 seconds and then determine the first five autocorrelation coefficients of these transaction price changes. GARCH intensity in a market is the sum of the absolute values of the autocorrelation coefficients for lags 1 to 5.
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We rerun the regression outlined in equation 2 using GARCH int as the dependent variable. Results are given in Table 2 (column 4, labeled GARCH int ).
We see that GARCH int increases monotonically with the number of insiders. insiders must be inferred. An explanation for the negative effect can be found in his experimental setup, where computerized noise traders provide liquidity to the market. These traders lack the capabilities of human traders to detect insider trading, which deteriorates the price discovery process.
So far we focused on average price efficiency in markets. The end of the section is devoted to analyzing the development of price efficiency over time. Therefore we divide each market into eight intervals of 30 sec. each and compute AD for each interval.
19 Average values of AD per competition level and interval are presented in Figure 3 . we run an exponential regression with one asymptote. Taken together, the evidence collected by the regression analyses support the notion that price efficiency evolves gradually over time. 23 We formulate 
Individual trading behavior
In this section we elaborate on RQ 3 about the traders' choice between order types. The analysis is organized along two lines. First, we examine the insiders' share in completed transactions (Section 3.2.1). By distinguish between trades originating from limit orders, referred to as limit trades (LT), and market orders (MO) we draw conclusions about how information finds its way into prices. Second, we analyze how the two trader types (insider/uninformed) solve the trade-off between limit and market orders (Section 3.2.2). The analyses presented throughout these two sections are based on a novel approach that discriminates between two market situations. The discrimination centers on implications originating from the insiders' informational advantage. Knowing the asset's precise value, insiders are able to assess the profitability of transactions and to avoid unprofitable trades. This ability, however, limits the insiders' freedom to choose between limit and market orders. To see this, consider the following two market situations.
In market situation 1 (SIT 1 ) the asset's BBV lies within the bid-ask spread. This situation effectively restricts the insiders' trading options to posting LOs.
Buy (sell) transactions based on MOs generate losses as they are executed at prices above (below) the BBV.
In market situation 2 (SIT 2 ) the asset's BBV lies outside the bid-ask spread,
i.e. the BBV is either above or below the best bid and the best ask at the same time. In that situation LOs and MOs yield profits and insiders are free to choose. Recall, however, that the common trade-off between the order types in terms of execution risk and price improvement remains. 24 Thus, the prevailing market situation crucially influences the insiders' action space.
To provide an overview about the distribution of trades across situations we compute the percentage of assets transacted under SIT 1 . In T 
The insiders' share in transactions
By analyzing the insiders' share in LTs and MOs we gain insights into the channels that convey the insiders' information. We define the insiders' market share as the volume in LT (MO) generated by all active insiders divided by the volume of LT (MO) generated by all active traders. The value falls in the interval [0,1] with higher values indicating increasing insider dominance.
In Figure 4 we plot the insiders' average market share in LTs and MOs by market situation (in columns), competition level (in rows), and minute trading time. Additionally, we include information on the insiders' expected market share to ease comparison across markets populated by different numbers of insiders. Assuming that all traders are equally active we expect the insiders' market share to equal the ratio of (active) insiders over all (active) traders.
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We formulate
Result 4. Insiders either dominate the trading process by successfully tendering limit orders (situation 1) or by triggering market orders (situation 2). Thus, conditional on the prevailing situation, either limit trades or market orders convey insider information.
The graphs depicted in the left column of Figure 4 reveal that insiders are 24 MO execute immediately at worse price conditions, whereas LO face execution risk but offer more favorable prices.
25 Assuming all traders are active, insiders have an expected market share of 1/7, 1/4, and 2/5 in T 1 ABC , T 2 ABC , and T 4 ABC , respectively. more (less) active than expected in the domain of LOs (MOs) across all competition levels when SIT 1 prevails. Thus, insiders are liquidity providers in SIT 1 .
In SIT 2 the picture reverses. Here, the insiders activity in LT is below expectations, whereas the activity in MO is clearly above expectations. Thus, if SIT 2 prevails, insiders act as liquidity consumers and their information is revealed to the market via market orders. At first sight, these results partly contradict Barner et al. (2005) who postulate that the information dissemination process is initiated by insiders using LO more actively than uninformed traders. However, a closer examination reveals that the discrepancy is likely to be found in the experimental designs. In Barner et al. (2005) the information content that needs to be conveyed to the market is small. From its current level the asset's value either increase or decrease by a fixed amount. Therefore, the necessary information dissemination reduces to an up or down signal. Given this setting it is sensible to assume that Barner et al.
(2005) are much more likely to observe markets dominated by SIT 1 . In contrast, the traders' task in our experiment is much more complex as the BBV is one realization out of 600 possibilities and uninformed traders learn the precise BBV only after trading ended. In this setting SIT 2 is much more likely to occur. By distinguishing between market situations, we are able to better understand the results of Barner et al. (2005) . The design choice of Barner et al. (2005) also accounts for the fact that the insiders' dominance in LO dissipates after the first minute whereas it remains constant in our experiment. The fast return to expected trading activity suggest that the signal transmission is completed by the first minute, wiping out the insiders' informational advantage.
The traders' order choice
The literature provides several theories on the insiders' choice between limit and market orders. By discriminating between SIT 1 and SIT 2 we are able to contribute valuable insights to the debate. We define a subject's trading strategy 
Conclusion
We conducted experiments to study price efficiency and trading behavior in limit order markets populated by asymmetrically informed traders. Markets differed in the realization of two treatment variables. First, we varied the number of insiders to analyze competition effects. Each market was populated by either 0, 1, 2 or 4 insiders and 6 uninformed traders who did not learn the BBV. Second, markets were characterized by one of three information sets that defined the subset of traders who received information about the number of insiders present.
Either none of the traders, only insiders, or all traders learned the number of insiders present in the market. With this manipulation we elaborated on the specific uncertainty about the presence of insiders that prevails in real world markets. The effects of this uncertainty could not be addressed in theoretical models.
We found that the degree of competition among insiders impacted limit order markets in a various ways and it influenced price efficiency and trading strate-gies available to insiders. Specifically, we documented that price efficiency (i) was the higher the higher the number of insiders supporting existing evidence To analyze trading behavior in the markets we developed a novel approach and defined two market situations based on the insiders' ability to assess the profitability of transactions. Market situation 1 prevailed if the asset's value lied within the bid-ask spread and it effectively restricted the insiders' trading options to limit orders. Market situation 2 described a situation in which the asset's value lied outside the bid-ask spread. In that situation limit and market orders yielded profits and insiders were free to choose. We found that (iv) the insiders' information was reflected in prices via limit (market) orders if the asset's value was inside (outside) the bid-ask spread. Thus, conditional on market situation either limit or market orders conveyed the insiders' information. Tables   Table 1: Treatment Column 3 (4) shows the number of insiders (uninformed traders). Values in parenthesis (# inactive) specify the average number of inactive insider (uninformed traders) in a market, i.e., traders that neither post limit orders nor trade via market orders. Notes: DEPENDENT VARIABLES: AD is the absolute difference between the (volume weighted) mean price in a market and the BBV. GARCH int is the GARCH intensity as outlined in Section 3.1 and in Bruguier et al. (2010) . INDEPENDENT VARI-ABLES: IN 1,2,4 are dummies equaling 1 for markets populated by 1, 2 or 4 insiders, respectively, zero otherwise. IS B,C are dummies equaling 1 for markets with information set B or C, respectively, zero otherwise. DIST AN CE is the absolute difference between the expected value of BBV and its realization.
INACT in,uninf is the number of inactive informed (uninformed) traders. BOU N D is the share of constrained insiders at the end of a market (stock holdings ≤6 and Taler holdings ≤480). Standard error (adjusted for clusters in sessions) are provided in parenthesis. *, ** and *** denote the 10%, 5% and the 1% significance levels. 
Appendix B: Experimental Instructions
Dear Participant!
We welcome you to this experimental session and kindly ask you to refrain from talking to each other for the duration of the experiment. If you have any questions regarding the procedure or the instructions of the experiments, contact one of the supervisors by raising your hand and your question will be answered privately.
Course of events during the session
This session consists of two experiments in which you can independently earn money. Before the experiment starts separate instructions will be handed out providing detailed information on the rules in the experiment.
Experiment 1 -Market experiment
• Instructions market experiment
• Explanation of the trading mechanism and trial periods (not relevant for your earnings)
• Experiment
Experiment 2
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• Instructions and experiment
• Questionnaire
Private payout Experiment 1 -Market experiment
General Information
This experiment replicates an asset market, which is populated by you and 9
other subjects. The composition of this cohort remains constant throughout the experiment, which consists of 16 independent periods.
Your payment from the experiment
You receive an amount of 20,-Euro for participating in the experiment. Profit and losses resulting from your activities during the 16 periods will be added to/subtratcted from the participation payment. Please note that your earning made in a specific period may be positive or negative (see below for details). Your payment from the experiment equals the participation payment plus the sum of your period earnings.
Your payment = 20 + Sum of period earnings
Your task within a period
At the beginning of each period you will learn your task within that period. You could either become a trader or a bookkeeper.
Trader: As trader you are an active market participant and you can buy/sell assets (of a virtual company). In each period at least 6 but at most 10 subjects of your cohort are traders. Bookkeeper: You do not participate in the market. In each period at least 0 but at most 4 subjects of your cohort are bookkeepers.
In the following we inform you about the task of a trader and the task of a bookkeeper.
Trader
As a trader you are a market participant and you can buy and sell assets. The trading mechanism is a double auction, i.e., each trader can be a buyer and/or a seller. 
Buy-back value of the asset
At the end of each period the experimenter buys back the assets you are holding at their buy-back value. This value is determined by a random device at the beginning of the period, which draws a number (with one decimal place) from the interval [20, 80] . Each number has the same probability to be drawn.
Information about the Buy-back value of the asset
Depending on the total number of traders, between 0 and 4 traders receive information on the precise buy-back value of the asset at the beginning of the period (these traders are called insiders). 6 traders do not receive this information about the buy-back value (these traders are called uninformed traders).
They only know that the buy-back value is a random number between 20 and 80 with equal probability.
Information about the number of insiders
Additionally to receiving information on the buy-back value you may be informed about the number of insiders present. 3 information sets exist:
1. No trader receives information about the number of insiders. (You know for sure if you are an insider or not).
2. All insiders are informed about the total number of insiders in the market.
Uninformed traders do not receive this information.
3. All traders (insiders and uninformed) receive information about the total number of insiders in the market.
Before trading starts you are informed whether you are an insider or an uninformed trader and you receive information corresponding to information set 1-3.
This information is accessible on the trading screen as well.
Your period earnings as a trader
Your trading success in relation to the other traders' success determines your earnings. Your wealth at the end of a period is compared to the average wealth of all traders. sell assets), your wealth equals the average wealth. Thus, your period earnings will be 0.00 and your final payment remains unchanged.
Bookkeeper
As a bookkeeper you earn money by solving exercises. An exercise is a calculation in which you multiply a two digit number by a one digit number. If your calculation is correct, the exercise is solved. If your calculation is wrong an error message appears. You have 4 minutes time to solve as many exercises as possible.
Your period earnings as a bookkeeper
For each correctly solved exercise you earn 0.05 Euro (5 Cent).
Period earnings in Euro = Number of solved exercises * 0.05
Important information
• No interest is paid for Taler holdings.
• Each trading period lasts for 240 seconds.
• The experiment ends after 16 periods.
• Offers to buy/sell the asset can be placed in the range from 0 to 999 (with at most two decimal places).
• The buy-back value is a random number with one decimal place.
• Use the full stop (.) as decimal place.
Trading screen: By means of the following figure, the procedure of trading (buying and selling) will be illustrated.
If you have information about the buy-back value of the asset or the number of insiders present, this information will be displayed here.
Information about current Asset and Taler holdings and your Wealth.
List of all BIDS: from all traders
-your own Bids are written in blue.
The offer with blue background is always the best, i.e., it yields the highest revenues for the seller.
List of all ASKS: from all traders -your own Asks are written in blue. The offer with blue background is always the best, i.e., it is the cheapest one for the buyer.
SELL:
You sell the entered Quantity, given the Price with the blue background. If you enter a higher amount than offered in the blue box, you sell the offered Quantity at most.
BUY:
You buy the entered Quantity, given the Price with the blue background. If you enter a higher amount than offered in the blue box, you buy the offered Quantity at most.
Current Market Price (of Asset)
Price-Chart of current period (starts at 0) 
